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abstraCt
Advisory opinions may be considered to challenge sovereignty because 
they often address political issues which may be contentious at the national 
level.  This paper argues that the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights 
is currently under pressure to uphold its legitimacy and examines whether 
the Court practices strategic prudence by rejecting certain requests for advi-
sory opinions. In particular, it discusses four cases involving political issues: 
alleged incompatibility of  national legislation with the American Conven-
tion, the prohibition of  corporal punishment of  children, the availability of  
judicial remedies for persons sentenced to death penalty, and due process 
rights relating to the impeachment of  the president of  Brazil. The article 
highlights that the examples of  restraint reveal a complex balance between 
the Court’s role in applying and interpreting human rights in relation to 
nurturing democracy while respecting sovereignty. This signals a possible 
tension between the conventionality control doctrine and the limitation of  
the Court’s advisory jurisdiction.
Keywords: Inter-American Court of  Human Rights, Advisory Opinions, 
Death Penalty, Corporal Punishment, Impeachment, Conventionality Con-
trol Doctrine, Legitimacy
resumo
Opiniões consultivas podem ser consideradas para desafiar a soberania 
porque elas freqüentemente tratam de questões políticas que podem ser 
controversas em nível nacional. Este artigo discute que a Corte Interameri-
cana de Direitos Humanos está atualmente sob pressão para defender sua le-
gitimidade e examina se a Corte desenvolve prudência estratégica ao rejeitar 
certos pedidos de opiniões consultivas. Em particular, discutem-se quatro 
casos envolvendo questões políticas: a alegada incompatibilidade da legisla-
ção nacional com a Convenção Americana, a proibição de castigos corporais 
de crianças, a disponibilidade de recursos judiciais para pessoas sentenciadas 
à pena de morte e os direitos processuais relativos à impeachment do presi-
dente do Brasil. O artigo destaca que os exemplos de contenção revelam um 
* Recebido em: 15/02/2018
  Aprovado em: 02/04/2018
** Professor, Department of  International 
and Public Law, University of  Oslo, Oslo, Nor-
way. Email: cecilia.bailliet@jus.uio.no. 
Acknowledgement: I would like to thank Na-
than Blikstad and Taina Maia for their research 
assistance.  I extend warm appreciation to Mat-
thew Saul, Jorge Contesse, and Daniel Naurin 
for their comments.
BA
IL
LI
E
T,
  C
ec
ili
a 
M
.. 
 T
he
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
pr
ud
en
ce
 o
f 
Th
e 
In
te
r-A
m
er
ica
n 
Co
ur
t o
f 
H
um
an
 R
ig
ht
s: 
re
jec
tio
n 
of
 re
qu
es
ts
 fo
r a
n 
ad
vi
so
ry
 o
pi
ni
on
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
15
, n
. 1
, 
20
18
 p
.2
54
-2
76
256
equilíbrio complexo entre o papel da Corte na aplica-
ção e interpretação dos direitos humanos em relação à 
promoção da democracia, respeitando a soberania. Isso 
sinaliza uma possível tensão entre a doutrina de con-
trole da convencionalidade e a limitação da jurisdição 
consultiva da Corte.
Palavras-chave: Corte Inter-Americana de Direitos 
Humanos, Opiniões consultivas, pena de morte, Casti-
go Corporal, Impeachment, Doutrina de Controle de 
Convencionalidade, Legitimidade.
1. introduCtion
Advisory opinions may be considered to be good 
examples of  output by international courts which may 
challenge the principle of  sovereignty because they may 
address political issues at the domestic level without ob-
taining state consent to jurisdiction.1  Because of  their 
non-binding character, they are considered to encou-
rage rather than compel state compliance.  The Inter-
-American Court of  Human Rights has actively utilized 
Advisory Opinions to evolve human rights interpreta-
tion and strengthen compliance within the region. In-
deed, as noted by Burgorgue-Larsen, it is notable that 
the Court had issued eight advisory opinions before de-
ciding it first contentious case, as neither States nor the 
Inter-American Commission referred any contentious 
cases to the Court between 1979 and 1986.2  Pursuant 
to Article 64 of  the American Convention on Human 
Rights, the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights is 
empowered to provide advisory opinions to any OAS 
member state on the interpretation of  the American 
Convention on Human Rights, as well as other trea-
ties concerning the protection of  human rights in the 
Americas, and on the compatibility of  national law with 
1 2 SCHMID, Julie Calidonio. ‘Advisory Opinions on Human 
Rights:  Moving Beyond a Pyrrhic Victory’16 Duke. J. Comp. & Int’l 
L. 415, 2006.
2  BURGORGUE-LARSEN, Laurence; TORRES, Amaya Ubeda 
de. The Inter-American Court of  Human Rights Case Law and Commentary 
85. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. See also Thomas Buer-
genthal, ‘Remembering the Early Years of  the Inter-American Court 
of  Human Rights, NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Jus-
tice’, Working Paper n. 1, 2005.  See also Gerald L. Neumann, ‘Im-
port, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights’, (2008) 19 (1) The European Journal of  Human Rights 
101, 103.  The Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights is a 
group of  independent experts which does not represent states, but 
instead is autonomous.
the American Convention or other treaties.3  There is 
no requirement that the requesting state be a party to 
the American Convention on Human Rights or have 
accepted the contentious jurisdiction of  the Court. In 
addition, all OAS organs may also request advisory 
opinions; indeed the Inter-American Commission ac-
tively seeks advisory opinions from the Court in order 
to evolve human rights law interpretation.4  The Court 
cannot issue an advisory opinion on its own motion.5
This article argues that the Inter-American Court 
of  Human Rights is currently under pressure to uphold 
its legitimacy and thus examines whether the Court is 
practicing strategic prudence by rejecting certain re-
quests for advisory opinions addressing political cases. 
In particular, it discusses the Court’s recent rejection of  
four cases: the first presented by the State of  Costa Rica 
specifically on the potential incompatibility of  legisla-
tion with the American Convention, the second pre-
sented by the Inter-American Commission of  Human 
Rights on the prohibition of  corporal punishment of  
children, the third also presented by the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights on judicial remedies to 
persons sentenced to death penalty, and the last presen-
ted by the OAS Secretary-General on alleged violation 
of  due process rights relating to impeachment of  the 
president of  Brazil.6
In comparison, it is important to note that the Euro-
pean Court of  Human Rights emits advisory opinions 
in response to requests by the Committee of  Ministers 
of  the Council of  Europe.7 Nevertheless, the manda-
3  See I/A Court H.R., ‘Other treaties’ subject to the consultative ju-
risdiction of  the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights). 
Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of  24 September 1982. Series A No. 1.
4  See SANDHOLTZ, Wayne. Expanding Rights: Norm Inno-
vation in the European and Inter-American Courts’. In: BRYSK, 
Alison; STOHL, Michael (Ed.) Expanding Human Rights: 21st Century 
Norms and Governance 156 (Edward Elgar 2017).
5   Jo M Pasqualucci, ‘Advisory Practice of  the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights: Contributing to the Evolution of  Interna-
tional Human Rights Law’, 38  Stan. J. Int’l. L. Journal 241, 253 (2002).
6  I/A Court H.R., Request of  Advisory Opinion submitted by 
the Republic of  Costa Rica. Order of  the Inter-American Court of  
Human Rights of  10 May 2005; I/A Court H.R., Request of  Advi-
sory Opinion submitted by the Inter-American Commission of  Hu-
man Rights. Order of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights 
of  24 June 24 2005; I/A Court H.R., Request of  Advisory Opinion 
submitted by the Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights. 
Order of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights of  27 January 
2009; I/A Court H.R., Request of  Advisory Opinion submitted by 
the Secretary General of  the Organization of  American States. Or-
der of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights of  23 June 2016.
7  See Protocol No. 2 (1970).
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te is limited to addressing legal questions concerning 
the interpretation of  the Convention and its Protocols, 
not the content or scope of  freedoms contained the-
rein.8 Hence, this article will instead make comparative 
references to relevant cases from the European Court 
of  Human Rights contentious practice as well as with 
the Inter-American Court’s own contentious practice in 
relation to similar issues, such as the impeachment of  
judges.  The article also refers to relevant reports from 
NGOs and media.
Part 2 provides a background overview of  the Ad-
visory Opinions of  the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court and the role of  the conventionality control doc-
trine; Part 3 sets out the limitations to the advisory ju-
risdiction, Part 4 presents the four rejection orders to 
requests for advisory opinions and explains the dilem-
mas leading to a potential strategy of  restraint, and Part 
5 offers a conclusion underscoring a tension between 
the conventionality control doctrine and the limitation 
of  the Court’s advisory jurisdiction. 
2. baCkground overview of the advisory 
opinions of the inter-ameriCan human 
rights Court
As of  February 2018, the Court’s website contains 
25 advisory opinions.9  Bert B. Lockwood stated that 
‘The advisory jurisdiction established by article 64 of  
the Convention may offer the most effective means of  
demonstrating the Court’s usefulness and providing the 
Court with an opportunity to develop a consistent and 
influential body of  human rights jurisprudence.’10  The 
8  Advisory opinions within this system have addressed the elec-
tion of  judges, including the need for representation of  women. 
The latter is an interesting issue to consider in the comparative 
perspective given the fact that the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights only has one woman judge, Elizabeth Odio Benito, as 
opposed to the European Court of  Human Rights which has 17 
women judges at present. See Advisory Opinion on certain legal questions 
concerning the lists of  candidates submitted with a view to the election of  judges 
to the European Court of  Human Rights, 12 February 2008 and Advisory 
Opinion on certain legal questions concerning the lists of  candidates submitted 
with a view to the election of  judges to the European Court of  Human Rights, 
22 January 2010. 
9  <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/busqueda_
opiniones_consultivas.cfm?lang=en> 
10  Bert B. Lockwood, Jr. ‘Advisory Opinions of  the Inter-Amer-
ican Court of  Human Rights’, 13 Denv. J. Int’l. L. & Pol’y 245, 246 
(1983-84).
Court has espoused a broad scope of  reference to nor-
mative sources in order to ground its pronouncements 
on the fundamental guarantees due to vulnerable per-
sons within the region.  It also accepts amicus curiae, 
enabling NGOs, experts, academics, and to a lesser ex-
tent corporations and states to engage in the develop-
ment of  human rights jurisprudence.11
The scope of  the Court’s advisory jurisprudence has 
evolved over time.  It commenced with decisions that 
addressed classic protection issues within international 
law.  The Court affirmed consular rights in the Opinion 
on Consular Relations12, confirmed the non-derogable 
status of  Habeus Corpus in the Opinion on Habeus 
Corpus in Emergency Situations13 and Opinion on Judi-
cial Guarantees in States of  Emergency14, and clarified 
children’s rights to fair trial and judicial protection (Ar-
ticles 8 & 25) in relation to Article 19 in the Opinion on 
Judicial Status and Human Rights of  the Child.15  
The Court also addressed procedural issues related 
to its function. Argentina requested an advisory opinion 
from the Court on Article 55 of  the American Conven-
tion, addressing whether the appointment of  an ad hoc 
judge should only apply to inter-state conflicts and whe-
ther in cases involving individual opinions, should the 
judge sharing the nationality of  the accused state recuse 
himself  or herself  from the case in order to maintain 
11  See MOYER, Charles. The Role of  Amicus Curiae in the Inter 
American Court of  Human Rights (Inter American Institute of  Hu-
man Rights 1985). Available at: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/
a11770.pdf>; see also the amici curiae of  the NGO CEJIL, available 
at: <https://cejil.org/en/amicus-curiae-0>; and Francisco J. Rivera 
Juaristi The Amicus Curiae in the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights (1982-2013), available at: <https://www.scribd.com/
document/252530356/The-Amicus-Curiae-in-the-Inter-American-
Court-of-Human-Rights-1982-2013> 
12  The judgment addresses the non-regional treaty, the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, The Right to Information on 
Consular Assistance in the Framework of  the Guarantees of  Due 
Process of  Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 of  1 October 1999, 
Series A, No. 16.
13  Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of  30 January 1987, Series A, No. 
8.
14  Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of  6 October 1987, Series A, No. 
9.
15  Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002 of  28 August 2002, Series A, 
No. 17. In the children’s rights cases, the Court refers to the CRC 
and the Declaration on the Rights of  the Child to emphasize the 
importance of  upholding ‘the best interests of  the child’ standard. 
It further refers to UN guidelines on juvenile justice and prevention 
of  juvenile delinquency, as well as non-custodial measures. Israel de 
Jesus Butler, ‘Recent Advisory Opinions and Contentious Cases of  
the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights’, 4(1) Human Rights 
Law Review 126, (2004).
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impartiality?16  Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, El Salvador, 
and Venezuela submitted written observations, indica-
ting significant interest by states. The Inter-American 
Commission of  Human Rights and several academic 
institutions also offered observations.  The Court held:
1. That in conformity with Article 55(3) of  the 
American Convention, the possibility for States Parties 
in a case submitted before the Inter-American Court to 
appoint a Judge ad hoc to be part of  the Court when 
there is no judge of  its nationality in its composition, is 
restricted to contentious cases originated in interstate 
communications (Article 45 of  said instrument), and 
that it is not possible to derive a similar right in favor of  
States Parties in cases originated in individual petitions 
(Article 44 of  said treaty). 
2. That the national judge of  the respondent State 
must not participate in the hearing of  individual cases.
This decision thus upheld the principles of  inde-
pendence and neutrality of  the organ in relation to fair 
processing of  cases.  
Another case involved Venezuela which requested 
an advisory opinion from the Court regarding whether 
there was an organ which has oversight over due process 
of  law in the proceedings before the Inter-American 
Commission of  Human Rights.17 Venezuela had been 
concerned with the Commission’s cases and reports 
on various human rights issues in Venezuela, including 
violation of  freedom of  expression, interference with 
the judiciary, extrajudicial executions, etc.18 The Court 
considered its competence to offer an advisory opin-
ion ‘as it relates to an organ within the inter-American 
system for the protection of  human rights, such as the 
Inter-American Commission, and to the extent that its 
ruling will serve to illustrate the scope of  the powers 
16  I/A Court H.R., ‘Article 55 of  the American Convention on 
Human Rights’. Advisory Opinion OC-20/09 of  29 September 29 
2009. Series A No. 20. 
17  I/A Court H.R., Control of  due process in the exercise of  
the powers of  the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(Articles 41 and 44 to 51 of  the American Convention on Human 
Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-19/05 of  28 November 2005. Series 
A No.19.
18  The Commission’s reports  on Venezuela are available here: 
<http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Venezuela2003eng/toc.htm> 
<http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Venezuela2009eng/VE09.
TOC.eng.htm>  <http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.256%20
12.258%20y%2012.307%20Blanco%20Romero%20y%20
otros%20Venezuela%2030jun04%20ESP.pdf>
The Commission has processed 17 cases involving Venezuela.
that the American Convention grants to the Commis-
sion for the promotion and defense of  human rights.’ 
The Court held that ‘the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights, in the exercise of  its functions, controls 
due process of  law in the proceedings before the In-
ter-American Commission of  Human Rights in relation 
to the processing of  matters that have been submitted 
to the Court’s consideration, in accordance with the 
competence granted to it by the American Convention 
and other inter-American instruments for the protec-
tion of  human rights.’  In spite of  the Court guarantee-
ing due process, Venezuela initiated a reform process of  
the Commission, seeking to limit its authority and trans-
fer of  its seat from Washington D.C. to a Latin Amer-
ican country, and eventually denounced the American 
Convention in 2012.19
This was followed by a period in which the Court 
addressed broader, holistic protection issues marked 
by the consequences of  globalization.  In the Advisory 
Opinion on the Juridical Condition and Rights of  the Undocu-
mented Migrants20, the Court responded to Mexico’s re-
quest for a clarification of  the status of  undocumented 
workers under international law, noting issues of  lega-
lity of  discrimination in the application of  internatio-
nal labor standards to migrant workers working illegally 
under national law. The Court received many amicus 
briefs from NGOs, labor rights groups, and law firms 
specializing in immigration cases. The Court sought to 
recognize non-discrimination as a jus cogens norm and 
underscored the due process and equality rights of  
migrant workers.  Further, it found the obligation to 
respect labor rights to be of  erga omnes character and 
incumbent on the state and private employer.  Thus, the 
Court highlighted the importance of  ensuring that un-
documented migrants have access to domestic courts, 
health care, and pension rights in like manner to regular 
employees.  This decision is formidable given the scope 
of  undocumented migrants in the United States, recen-
tly underscored by President Trump’s decision to build 
a wall on the US-Mexico border and his support of  de-
19  <http://www.ijrcenter.org/2012/09/19/venezuela-denounc-
es-american-convention-on-human-rights-as-iachr-faces-reform/ >
20  Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of  18 September 2003, Series 
A. No. 18. Referring to the ICCPR; UDHR, OAS Charter, ADHR, 
and ACHR the Court recognized that the Opinion would apply to 
OAS Member States that have signed the OAS Charter, the Ameri-
can Declaration, or the Universal Declaration or ratified the ICCPR, 
regardless of  whether they have ratified the American Convention 
or optional protocols.  
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portation of  migrants.21 On the one hand, the Court 
may appear to have embarked upon a strategically risky 
path by addressing state responsibility in the context of  
transnational migration, but on the other hand as the 
US is not a party to the American Convention and has 
not accepted the jurisdiction of  the Court, the Court 
had no risk of  ‘losing’ the United States.  According 
to Judge Ferrer MacGregror, these advisory opinions 
serve as a legal source for all OAS Member States (in-
cluding the US which is not a party to the Convention) 
in order to contribute to human rights.22
This opinion was later complemented by the Advi-
sory Opinion addressing the Rights and Guarantees of  Children 
in the Context of  Migration as requested by Argentina, 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay.23 The applicant states 
indicated that there is a ‘lack of  legislation and public 
policies related to different issues that are examined in 
the request. [… A] still-frequent feature in some laws 
and migratory policies is the lack of  the corresponding 
interrelation with the system of  protection of  the rights 
of  the child, limiting the capability of  public institutions 
to adequately define the measures that they must adopt 
whenever a child enters a country in an irregular man-
ner’ which usually results in ‘the absence of  adequate 
procedures to identify the different risk situations fa-
ced by those children in mixed migration flows.’24 Briefs 
were provided by Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, and 
Mexico, as well as many IOs, including UNHCR, IOM, 
and UNICEF, as well as NGOs and academic institu-
tions.
The Court explained how the contextual ba-
ckground of  the request served to legitimize its engage-
ment through the advisory function to clarify the rights 
of  child migrants:   
That from this perspective, the Court understands 
that its answer to the request submitted will be of  spe-
cific usefulness in the context of  a regional reality in 
which aspects relating to State obligations concerning 
21  <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/
donald-trump-mexico-immigration-speech-border-wall-will-pay-
latest-news-us-election-2016-a7219416.html.  See also:  <https://
www.dhs.gov/executive-orders-protecting-homeland>.
22  MAC-GREGOR, E. F. ‘Conventionality Control the New 
Doctrine of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights’, AJIL Un-
bound, 109, p. 96, 2015.
23  I/A Court H.R., Rights and guarantees of  children in the context 
of  migration and/or in need of  international protection. Advisory Opinion 
OC-21/14 of  19 August  2014. Series A n.21.
24  Para. 26
migrant children have not been clearly and systema-
tically established, based on the interpretation of  the 
relevant norms. This usefulness is revealed by the sig-
nificant interest indicated by all the participants in this 
advisory procedure. First the request itself, presented by 
four States, which offers, based on the unified position 
of  the four States, a basic consensual standard in this 
regard. In addition, 42 briefs with observations were re-
ceived, submitted by five OAS Member States, the Inter-
-American Commission, the Inter-American Children’s 
Institute, four international agencies, and 31 institutions 
and individual members of  different organizations, civil 
society in general, and academic institutions. Similarly, 
nine OAS Member States, the Inter-American Commis-
sion, three international agencies, and 14 institutions 
and individual members of  different organizations, civil 
society in general and academic institutions played an 
active role in the public hearing.25
The Court affirmed the conventionality control doc-
trine, described by Judge Ferrer MacGregor as:
(C)reat(ing) the international obligation on all Sta-
tes parties to the ACHR to interpret any national legal 
instruments (the constitution, laws, decrees, regulations, 
jurisprudence, etc.) in accordance with the ACHR and 
with the Inter-American corpus juris more generally. 
Wherever a domestic instrument is manifestly incompa-
tible with the Inter-American corpus juris, state authori-
ties must refrain from application of  this law, in order to 
avoid any violation of  internationally protected rights.26
The Court firsts developed this doctrine within its 
contentious jurisdiction, as it declared national amnesty 
laws to be manifestly incompatible with the American 
Convention on Human Rights, constituting violations 
in themselves and incurring international liability.27 This 
doctrine prompted a significant shift in legal education 
and practice within Latin America, as lawyers and jud-
ges were expected to understand the relevance of  the 
American Convention and case law of  the Court to na-
25  Para. 27
26  Mac-Gregor, supra note 22 at 93. See also Jorge Contesse,’ 
Contestation and Deference in the Inter-American Human Rights 
System’. 79 (2) Law & Contemporary Problems, (1 April 2016). Avail-
able at: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2799476>, citing Ariel E. Du-
litzky, ‘An Inter-American Constitutional Court? The Invention of  
the Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights’, 50 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 45 (2015). 
27  See ‘Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations, and Costs’, Judgment IACtHR No. 154 (26 
September 2006).
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tional cases.  Judge Ferrer MacGregor characterizes this 
doctrine as ‘consonant with democratic values and one 
that helps make human rights more effective.’28 He no-
tes that one of  the objectives of  the doctrine is ‘to bols-
ter the complementarity (subsidiarity) of  national and 
Inter-American systems and to create a genuinely “inte-
grated system” of  human rights protection. . . (and to) 
facilitate and increase dialogue, especially judicial dia-
logue, between national courts and the Inter-American 
Court on the subject of  human rights.’ There has been 
a growing awareness within national jurisdictions of  the 
importance of  ensuring that legislation is in accordan-
ce with regional human rights standards. It is arguable 
that the advisory jurisdiction could potentially have an 
important role in supporting state initiatives to meet 
its obligations when adopting new legislation.  Indeed, 
Judge Ferrer MacGregor indicates that the conventio-
nality control doctrine is also applicable to its advisory 
output, citing the Court’s Advisory Opinion:
Different organs of  the State must carry out the cor-
responding control of  conformity with the Convention, 
based also on the considerations of  the Court in exerci-
se of  its non-contentious or advisory jurisdiction, which 
undeniably shares with its contentious jurisdiction the 
goal of  the inter-American human rights system, whi-
ch is “the protection of  the fundamental rights of  the 
human being.” Furthermore, the interpretation given 
to a provision of  the Convention through an advisory 
opinion provides all the organs of  the Member States 
of  the OAS, including those that are not parties to the 
Convention but that have undertaken to respect human 
rights under the Charter of  the OAS (Article 3(l)) and 
the Inter-American Democratic Charter (Articles 3, 7, 8 
and 9), with a source that, by its very nature, also con-
tributes, especially in a preventive manner, to achieving 
the effective respect and guarantee of  human rights. In 
particular, it can provide guidance when deciding mat-
ters relating to children in the context of  migration and 
to avoid possible human rights violations.29
Notwithstanding, one may suggest that there is a 
tension between the Court’s interest in providing ad-
visory output as an additional source to be utilized wi-
thin conventionality control and the imperative to avoid 
the advisory jurisdiction to serve as a mechanism which 
may undercut the contentious jurisdiction.
28  Ferrer Mac Gregor, supra note 22 at 93.
29  Ibid. at 96
The opinion set forth the obligations of  states to 
give priority to human rights based approaches over 
consideration of  nationality or migratory status and to 
identify non-national children who require international 
protection. The Court relied on the American Conven-
tion, the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and 
Punish Torture, and the American Declaration of  the 
Rights and Duties of  Man. Further, the Court set forth 
that states are expected to guarantee due process and 
pursue “the best interest of  the child” as a paramount 
consideration in decisions.  Additionally, the Court re-
cognized the duty to respect the prohibition of  depriva-
tion of  liberty as a precautionary measure, the principle 
of  family unity, the prohibition on refoulement, and the 
duty refrain from expelling the parents of  child natio-
nals for administrative immigration offenses.30  This de-
cision provides an extremely comprehensive protection 
framework for migrant children, and as it was requested 
by States, the Court was secure in responding by articu-
lating a clear legal protection framework to assist states 
to address vulnerable persons, characterizing it as a po-
sitive example of  a preventive conventionality control 
doctrine. The Inter-American Commission of  Human 
Rights has followed up these advisory opinions by visits 
to the US and monitoring the situation of  migrants, in-
cluding children.31
In 2016, the Court issued an Advisory Opinion on 
the entitlement of  legal entities to hold rights under the 
Inter-American Human Rights system.32  This request 
was raised by Panama, which indicated that the issue 
was of  concern to various states within the region, and 
indeed Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Gua-
temala and Honduras submitted observations.  This was 
complemented by written observations presented by a 
variety of  IOs, NGOs, academics, and other civil so-
ciety actors.  The Court concluded that the American 
Convention, Article 1, applies to human persons, not 
juridical persons. It specified that indigenous commu-
30  I/A Court H.R., Rights and guarantees of  children in the con-
text of  migration and/or in need of  international protection. Advi-
sory Opinion OC-21/14 of  19 August 2014. Series A No.21. 
31  <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleas-
es/2014/105.asp> 
32  I/A Court H.R., Entitlement of  legal entities to hold rights 
under the Inter-American human rights system (Interpretation and 
scope of  Article 1(2), in relation to Articles 1(2), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 
24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 46 and 62(3) of  the American Convention on Hu-
man Rights, as well as of  Article 8(1)(A) and (B) of  the Protocol of  
San Salvador). Advisory Opinion OC-22/16 of  26 February 2016. 
Series A No. 22.
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nities and tribes enjoy rights within the Convention and 
may access the Inter-American system. In addition, the 
San Salvador Protocol grants rights to syndicates, fe-
derations, and confederations, which enables them to 
defend their rights within the Inter-American system.33 
The Court also held that in certain cases, physical per-
sons can enjoy their rights by way of  legal persons (such 
as shareholders and their right to property or media and 
freedom of  expression) and thus access the system ac-
cordingly.  This case indicates the Court’s recognition 
of  the growing importance of  non-state actors and the 
need to address them within the human rights system. 
As this case was raised by a State and addressed the in-
terpretation of  the Convention, it falls squarely within 
the paradigm of  normative consultation and hence the 
Court faced little risk in accepting the request.
In 2017, the Court delivered an Advisory Opinion on 
the Environment and Human Rights.34 Colombia re-
quested the Court to clarify whether states engaged in 
development infrastructure projects in maritime zones 
(such as the Caribbean Coast) have an obligation to 
conduct environmental impact assessments given the 
risk of  possible impact on the right to life (Article 4) 
and physical integrity (Article 5) of  coastal inhabitants. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Honduras, and Panama provided 
written observations. The Inter-American Commission 
of  Human Rights, a representative for the OAS Secre-
tary General, and the International Union for the Con-
servation of  Nature also provided written submissions. 
In addition, the International Maritime Organization, 
NGOs, academics, and other civil society groups pro-
vided statements.  The Court articulates the view that 
the American Convention is applicable wherever mem-
ber States exercise authority or effective control over 
persons within or outside of  their territory.  The Court 
set forth that States have an obligation to prevent sig-
nificant environmental damage within or outside of  
its territory, hence they should regulate and supervise 
activities under their jurisdiction.  Further they should 
33  Organization of  American States (OAS), Additional Proto-
col to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of  
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘Protocol of  San Salvador’), 
16 November 1999, A-52, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/
docid/3ae6b3b90.html>   
34  I/A Court H.R., The Environment and Human Rights (State 
obligations in relation to the environment in the context of  the pro-
tection and guarantee of  the rights to life and to personal integrity), 
interpretation and scope of  Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of  the American 
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 of  
November 15, 2017. Series A No. 23.
complete environmental impact assessments when the-
re is a risk of  significant damage to the environment, es-
tablish a contingency plan, maintain security measures 
and procedures to minimize the risk of  large environ-
mental accidents, and mitigate damage in the event of  
such accidents.  The Court called upon states to act in 
conformance with the precautionary principle, in order 
to protect the right to life and the right to physical inte-
grity.  Further, the Court identified an obligation to coo-
perate in good faith in order to protect against trans-
-border damage to the environment.  States are obliged 
to notify, consult and negotiate in good faith with sta-
tes that may be potentially affected by an action which 
may result in significant trans-border damage and also 
in cases of  environmental emergencies.  Further, the 
Court recognized the duty of  States to guarantee the 
right of  access to information on the possible impact 
on the environment, the right of  public participation of  
persons under their jurisdiction in decision making on 
issues affecting the environment, and access to justice.
Also in 2017, the Court published an Advisory 
Opinion on Gender identity, and equality and non-dis-
crimination with regard to same-sex couples.35  Costa 
Rica petitioned the Court to explain whether gender 
identity is a protected category according to the Ame-
rican Convention on Human Rights, thereby requiring 
states to fulfill requests for a name change in relation 
to gender as well as recognition of  same-sex marria-
ge.  Additionally, Costa Rica requested clarification 
of  whether persons joined via same sex union would 
acquire all propriety rights. Costa Rica indicated that 
there was divergent practice among member states of  
the Inter-American system.  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and 
Uruguay provided written observations.  The states 
that did recognize same sex marriage at the time were 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Mexico, the Uni-
ted States, and Uruguay.  Some states, including Costa 
Rica, have experienced strong polarization within their 
societies on this issue. Ironically, the contentious level 
of  politicization of  same sex marriage impacted even 
the presidential election within the same country which 
35  I/A Court H.R., Gender identity, and equality and non-discrimination 
with regard to same-sex couples. State obligations in relation to change of  name, 
gender identity, and rights deriving from a relationship between same-sex couples 
(interpretation and scope of  Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in 
relation to Article 1, of  the American Convention on Human Rights). Advi-
sory Opinion OC-24/17 of  November 24, 2017. Series A No. 24.
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had filed the petition for the advisory opinion.36 The 
Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights, the UN 
Office of  the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
national public defenders offices, and a large number 
of  NGOs, academics, and other civil society actors also 
submitted written observations. The Court undersco-
red that equality and non-discrimination guarantees are 
considered jus cogens within international law and pro-
vides a thorough examination of  the evolution of  state 
practice and international human rights policy regarding 
gender identity issues.  It concluded that states are obli-
gated to recognize, regulate, and establish procedures to 
provide access to public registries and ID documenta-
tion in accordance with gender identity, in accordance 
with the right to a juridical personality (Article 3), the 
right to personal liberty and security (Article 7.1), right 
to privacy (Article 11.2), the right to a name (Article 
18), in conjunction with the state’s obligation to protect 
rights (Article 1) and the right of  equal protection (Ar-
ticle 24).  The Court stated that states are required to 
provide an administrative procedure to comply with the 
right to register in conformance with gender identity, as 
long as the procedure recognized the self-identity of  the 
person, maintained confidentiality, based on free and in-
formed consent, without requiring hormonal treatment 
or surgery, was speedy and free. The Court determined 
that same sex unions were protected in accordance with 
the right to privacy (Article 11) and the right to fami-
ly life (Article 17) and called upon states to recognize 
same-sex marriage and propriety rights in conformance 
with the right of  equal protection (Article 24). LBGTI 
advocacy groups across Latin America celebrated but 
also cautioned that there may be backlashes against im-
plementation of  this advisory opinion, hence one may 
suggest that it may be a real test of  the viability of  the 
preventive conventionality control doctrine.
Taken together, these advisory opinions underscore 
the value of  this mechanism for upholding the primacy 
of  protection interests of  vulnerable individuals against 
exertion of  state power.  They also reveal the deliberate 
use of  advisory opinions to strengthen the normative 
evolution of  human rights law. It is suggested that these 
cases are balanced by the Court’s parallel rejection of  
requests which address certain political cases and prag-
matically signal deference to States.
36  <http://www.ticotimes.net/2018/01/31/same-sex-marriage-
issue-shifts-elections-in-costa-rica>
3. limitations to the advisory JurisdiCtion 
of the inter-ameriCan Court of human 
rights
The Inter-American Court is mindful of  limitations 
to its advisory jurisdiction. The first is that the advisory 
opinion may only address the interpretation of  trea-
ties which relate to the protection of  human rights in a 
Member State. These treaties need not be only from the 
Americas, nor need they be human rights treaties per 
se, but their provisions should relate to human rights.37 
Political cases may involve issues which merge human 
rights concerns with questions regarding the separation 
of  powers, the rule of  law, and the function of  demo-
cratic institutions.  On the one hand, as with the ICJ, the 
advisory jurisdiction may facilitate political resolution 
of  a problem via adjudication.38  On the other hand, the 
Court may risk losing credibility should it be deemed to 
overstep boundaries; hence volatile political issues may 
spark a backlash against the Court.  Hence, the Court 
must strike a balance when determining which issues to 
accept pursuant to the advisory jurisdiction.
The second limitation is that that cases which are 
likely to undermine the Court’s contentious jurisdiction 
or weaken the system addressing the protection of  vic-
tims should be deemed inadmissible. 39 Respect for the 
primacy of  contentious jurisdiction within international 
law roots back to the Permanent Court of  International 
Justice’s decision in the Eastern Carelia Case in 1923. 
40  In this case, the Court determined that it could not 
deliver an advisory opinion on  the obligations of  Rus-
sia towards Finland regarding Eastern Carelia given that 
Russia had not given its consent to have this issue re-
solved through the League of  Nations nor the Court. 
37  Parker, ‘Other Treaties’: The Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights Defines its Advisory Jurisdiction, 33 Ass. U.L.
REV. 211 (1983). I/A Court H.R., ‘Other treaties’ subject to the 
advisory jurisdiction of  the Court (Art. 64 American Convention 
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of  24 September 
1982, Series A No. 1. 
38  See for example, David Sloss, ‘Using International Court of  
Justice Advisory Opinions to Adjudicate Secessionist Claims’, 42 
Santa Clara L. Rev. 357 (2001).
39  Burgorgue-Larsen et. al. supra note 2 at 79.  See also Thomas 
Buergenthal, ‘The Advisory Practice of  the Inter-American Human 
Rights Court’, 79 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 27 at 11 (1985), citing the Adviso-
ry Opinion on Restrictions to the Death Penalty (1983) paras. 36-37.
40  Status of  Eastern Carelia, USSR v Finland, Advisory Opinion, 
(1923) PCIJ Series B no 5, ICGJ 272 (PCIJ 1923), 23rd July 1923, 
Permanent Court of  International Justice (historical) [PCIJ]
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In like manner, the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights is reluctant to violate sovereign expectations re-
garding consent and be accused of  delivering ex parte 
decisions.
Nevertheless, the ICJ has addressed highly political 
cases within its advisory jurisdiction, such as the Legal 
Consequences of  the Construction of  a Wall case and the Le-
gality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear Weapons Case.41 Hen-
ce, there is also comparative precedent for openness to 
addressing claims which may fall within a grey zone of  
relevance to both contentious and advisory jurisdiction. 
Indeed, the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights it-
self  has also demonstrated such extensibility in its advi-
sory cases addressing the rights of  migrants.42
Finally, the last limitation is that the Court is to con-
sider each request individually and may find compelling 
reasons to issue a denial which is to be issued with rea-
sons.  This is an open provision which grants the Court 
flexibility in exhibiting strategic prudence when deter-
mining whether or not to proceed with a case.
4. reJeCtion orders to requests for 
advisory opinion
Since 2005, the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights has rejected four requests for advisory opinions 
while issuing six advisory opinions in the same period. 
The six positive responses involve requests which were 
all presented by states largely addressing normative or 
procedural interpretation and were presented in section 
IV.43 The rejection orders indicate a tension between the 
41  Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of  the Construction 
of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court of  
Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/
docid/414ad9a719.html>  and Legality of  the Threat or Use of  Nuclear 
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226, Internation-
al Court of  Justice (ICJ), 8 July 1996, available at: <http://www.
refworld.org/docid/4b2913d62.html >
42  I/A Court H. R., Advisory Opinion on the Juridical Condition and 
Rights of  the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03 of  
18 September 2003, Series A. No. 18: and I/A Court H.R., Rights 
and guarantees of  children in the context of  migration and/or in need of  inter-
national protection. Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 of  19 August 2014. 
Series A No.21.
43 I/A Court H.R., The Environment and Human Rights (State obliga-
tions in relation to the environment in the context of  the protection and guar-
antee of  the rights to life and to personal integrity), interpretation and scope of  
Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of  the American Convention on Human Rights). Ad-
visory Opinion OC-23/17 of  November 15, 2017. Series A No. 
Inter-American Commission’s interest in developing 
human rights law through advisory opinions on key is-
sues, and the Court’s concern regarding maintaining le-
gitimacy before Member States which are protective of  
sovereignty interests.  The first rejection order involves 
a case in which a State requested an advisory opinion 
addressing incompatibility of  legislation with the Ame-
rican Convention of  Human Rights, a straightforward 
request.  However, the latter cases are more complex. 
The Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights 
sought an advisory opinion on Corporal Punishment 
of  Children and another advisory opinion on the appli-
cation of  the Death Penalty, and the OAS Secretary Ge-
neral solicited an advisory opinion in order to address 
alleged irregularities within the Brazilian impeachment 
proceedings against the President. These cases prove 
problematic from a strategic perspective.
4.1. The Incompatibility of Legislation with the 
American Convention of Human Rights
The Court has rejected requests to issue advisory 
opinions on legislation, in contrast to its willingness 
to strike legislation as incompatible with the American 
Convention on Human Rights within its contentious ju-
risdiction, and this highlights the dilemma the Court has 
with its conflicting obligations to assist states to streng-
then its democratic institutions and norms while at the 
same time respecting sovereignty.44
23.  I/A Court H.R., Gender identity, and equality and non-discrimination 
with regard to same-sex couples. State obligations in relation to change of  name, 
gender identity, and rights deriving from a relationship between same-sex couples 
(interpretation and scope of  Articles 1(1), 3, 7, 11(2), 13, 17, 18 and 24, in 
relation to Article 1, of  the American Convention on Human Rights). Ad-
visory Opinion OC-24/17 of  November 24, 2017. Series A No. 
24. I/A Court H.R., Entitlement of  legal entities to hold rights under the 
inter-American human rights system (Interpretation and scope of  Article 
1(2), in relation to Articles 1(2), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44, 
46 and 62(3) of  the American Convention on Human Rights, as well 
as of  Article 8(1)(A) and (B) of  the Protocol of  San Salvador). Advi-
sory Opinion OC-22/16 of  26 February 2016. Series A No. 22.; I/A 
Court H.R., Rights and guarantees of  children in the context of  migration 
and/or in need of  international protection. Advisory Opinion OC-21/14 
of  19 August 2014. Series A No.21.; I/A Court H.R., ‘Article 55 
of  the American Convention on Human Rights’. Advisory Opinion OC-
20/09 of  September 29, 2009. Series A No. 20.;  I/A Court H.R., 
Control of  due process in the exercise of  the powers of  the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Articles 41 and 44 to 51 of  the American 
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-19/05 of  28 
November 2005. Series A No.19.        
44  See e.g. IACtHR, Case of  Gelman v. Uruguay (Merits and Repa-
rations), 24 February 2011, at 229, and 238-239. The case involved 
an amnesty law approved by national referendum which eliminated 
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In 2005, the Court rejected a request by Costa Rica 
for an advisory opinion on whether its Personnel legis-
lation of  the Legislative Assembly is incompatible with 
American Convention on Human Rights and the San 
Salvador Protocol on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights.45 The Court reasoned that to issue an opinion 
would risk addressing litigious issues which were not yet 
resolved at the domestic level nor submitted to the con-
tentious jurisdiction of  the Commission or the Court. 
The Court cited its own jurisprudence noting:
The request should be carefully analized in order 
to determine, among other things, whether the 
aim is to help the soliciting State comply with its 
international human rights obligations. For such 
purpose, the Court should act cautiously in order 
to guarantee that its advisory jurisdiction will not 
be utilized as a tool for political debate with the aim 
of  affecting the result of  the domestic legislative 
process. In other words, the Court should not 
immerse itself  in internal political disputes, 
which may affect the role assigned to it by the 
Convention.46  
Furthermore, the Court indicates support for the 
national court to fulfill its duty regarding safeguarding 
human rights: 
That the normative conflict presented as the ante-
cedent to the request is based on the issue regarding 
the compatibility of  legal limitations applied to appoint-
ment of  officials within the legislative organ of  the state, 
who have some degree of  relationship to other officials 
or members of  the legislature.  The “reasonable doubt” 
which the State sets forth as grounds for its request is 
the existence of  a minority vote in the resolution of  
an Unconstitutional Order issued by the Constitutional 
Court of  the Supreme Court of  Justice as pertaining 
the norm presented in the request.  The Court notes the 
fact that the State seeks that this tribunal issue an opi-
nion on an issue which the Constitutional Court already 
decided, in spite of  the fact that when at the time of  
presenting the request, the decision was not yet publi-
the possibility of  prosecution of  military and police officers who 
participated in arbitrary detention, torture, and enforced disappear-
ance.  The Inter-American Court determined that the referendum 
was an act of  state incurring state responsibility.  See also Almonacid-
Arellano et al. v. Chile, IACtHR, Judgment of  26 September 2006 re-
garding the illegality of  the amnesty law in Chile. 
45  Resolution of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights on 
the Request for an Advisory Opinion by Costa Rica (10 May 2005) 
on Law No. 4556 (8 May 1970).
46  I/A Court H.R., Proposed Amendments of  the Naturalization Provi-
sions of  the Constitution of  Costa Rica. Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of  
19 January 1984. Series A No. 4. at para. 30.  
shed, only its holding was disseminated.  Furthermore, 
not only does the request seek that the Court, by way of  
its advisory competence, indirectly revise what has been 
resolved by the Constitutional Court, but the State also 
requests that the Court address the scope of  the norm 
which establishes an erga omnes character within consti-
tutional jurisprudence vis-a-vis the American Conven-
tion and an eventual advisory opinion of  the Court.  
Hence the Court recognizes the role of  the national 
judicial and legislative processes in ensuring complian-
ce with human rights. Yet, this appears contradictory, 
as in this case it is the State itself  which requests gui-
dance from the Court. One would have expected that 
the Court would be more forthcoming in providing re-
commendations to the State in a non-confrontational 
manner, instead of  indicating that the adjudication me-
chanism is favorable. In this case, the Court appears to 
support the competence of  the Constitutional Court to 
uphold human rights.  
In sum, it is possible that the Court is concerned 
about ‘political questions’, which the Court deems a 
matter to be more appropriately settled within the na-
tional jurisdiction, further the Court may be cautious 
about prompting confrontation with a State, ultimate-
ly risking withdrawal from the Court’s jurisdiction.47 In 
contrast, the pressure on the Court to address legisla-
tion increases when the inputs come from civil society 
interest groups which channel their causes through the 
Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights which 
in turn submits an advisory request to the Court. 
4.2. Corporal Punishment of Children
Children’s rights have received much attention from 
civil society groups.48  In particular, the campaign to 
end corporal punishment of  children has been very 
significant.49 In 2009, the Court rejected a request by 
the Inter-American Commission of  Human Rights to 
47  See Tsereteli, supra note 26 at 1098.
48  See for example, Humanium, available at: <http://www.hu-
manium.org/es/derechos/> and <http://www.deathpenaltypro-
ject.org/where-we-operate/international/the-inter-american-court-
of-human-rights/>
49  See: <http://www.endcorporalpunishment.org/> and 
<http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/keyword/corporal-pun-
ishment> and <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XM-
L2HTML-EN.asp?fileid=17235&lang=en> and <https://www.
coe.int/en/web/children/corporal-punishment> and <http://hr-
library.umn.edu/crc/comment8.html> 
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address corporal punishment of  children.50  This case 
was promoted by the Commission to generate a regio-
nal debate, given that at that time only three states wi-
thin Latin America prohibited this type of  punishment 
(Costa Rica, Uruguay, and Venezuela). The dearth of  
legislation indicated a lack of  regional consensus, whi-
ch Gerald Neuman characterizes as possibly indicating 
‘unresolved conflicts of  values or that policy regarding 
new social conditions is in flux.’51  However, the Court 
refused to issue an opinion, noting that it had addressed 
children’s rights in its advisory opinion on The Juridical 
Condition and Human Rights of  the Child, as well as in seve-
ral of  its contentious cases.52 Nevertheless, it is arguable 
that the jurisprudence leaves some gaps.  For example, 
in the contentious case of  The Street Children, which 
involved the abduction, torture, and murder of  five 
street children in 1990 in Guatemala, the Court held the 
State in violation of  their right to personal liberty (art. 
7), right to life (art . 4), right to humane treatment (art. 
5), rights of  the child (art. 19), rights to judicial protec-
tion and a fair trial (arts. 25, 8 and 1(1), and violation 
50  Resolution of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights on 
the Request for an Advisory Opinion by the Inter-American Com-
mission of  Human Rights (27 January 2009).
51  Gerald L. Neuman,’ Import, Export, and Regional Consent 
in the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights’, 19 (1) The Euro-
pean Journal of  International Law 102, 107 (2008). Tsereteli states 
that ‘the IACtHR does not carry out a  comprehensive examina-
tion of  relevant national practices to establish regional consensus 
in support of  an evolutive interpretation of  human rights.’ Further, 
she concludes ‘It relies on national interpretations selectively, only 
when they are consistent with its own interpretation.’ See Tseretelli, 
supra note 26 at 1100-1101 and 1104,citing Pablo Contreras, ‘Na-
tional Discretion and International Deference in the Restriction of  
Human Rights: A Comparison between the Jurisprudence of  the 
European and the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights’, 28 
Northwestern Journal of  Human Rights 71 (2012).
52 Case of  the ‘Street Children ‘ (Villagran-Morales et al.) v. Gua-
temala Judgment of  19 November  1999.; I/A Court H.R., Case of  
Bulacio v Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs.  Judgment of  
18 September 2003. Series C No. 100: Case of  the Gómez-Paqui-
yauri Brothers v. Peru.  Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of  
8 July 2004. Series C No. 110; I/A Court H.R.. Case of  the Juvenile 
Re-education Institute v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, Costs.  Judgment of  2 September 2004, Series C No. 
112 , Case of  Bámaca-Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits.   Judgment 
of  25 November 2000. Series C No. 70, Case of  Maritza Urrutia v 
Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, Costs.   Judgment of  27 November 
2003. Series C No. 103, Case of  the Yean and Bosico Children v. The 
Dominican Republic, Inter-American Court of  Human Rights (IA-
CrtHR), 8 September 2005, Case of  Servellón-García et al. v. Honduras, 
Judgment of  21 September 2006 (Merits, Reparations and Costs), 
Matter of  Children Deprived of  Liberty in the ‘Complexo do Tatuapé’ of  
FEBEM, Provisional Order by the Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights issued to  Brazil (25 November 2008).
of  the Inter American Convention to Prevent and Pu-
nish Torture (Articles 1,6, and 8).  It was the first time 
the Inter-American Court identified the duty of  states 
to adopt special measures to protect children whose ri-
ghts are under threat or violated according to Article 19 
(ACHR):
Every minor child has the right to the measures of  
protection required by his condition as a minor on the 
part of  his family, society, and the state.
The Court stated that the right to life comprises not 
only the right of  all persons to not being deprived of  
life arbitrarily, but also the right to having access to the 
conditions needed to lead a dignified life: 
When States violate the rights of  at-risk children, 
such as ‘street children’, in this way, it makes them vic-
tims of  a double aggression.  First, such States do not 
prevent them from living in misery, thus depriving them 
of  the minimum conditions for a dignified life and pre-
venting them from living in misery, thus depriving them 
of  the harmonious development of  their personality, 
even though every child has the right to harbor a project 
of  life that should be tended and encouraged by the pu-
blic authorities so that he/she may develop this project 
for his/her personal benefit and that of  the society to 
which he/she belongs.  Second, they violate their phy-
sical, mental and moral integrity and even their lives.53 
It also based its interpretation on the UN Conven-
tion on the Rights of  the Child (hereinafter CRC), no-
ting ‘Both the American Convention and the Conven-
tion on the Rights of  the Child form part of  a very 
comprehensive international corpus juris for the pro-
tection of  the child that should help this Court establish 
the content and scope of  the general provision establi-
shed in Article 19 of  the American Convention.’54  The 
Court cites the CRC, Article 2 on non-discrimination, 
Article 3 on state protection, Article 6 on the right to 
life, survival, and development, Article 20 on child wel-
fare guarantees for children deprived of  family envi-
ronment, Article 27 on an adequate standard of  living 
for development, and Article 37 on the prohibition of  
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, arbitrary de-
tention, humane treatment in detention, and right to ac-
cess to legal aid.  The Court emphasized the scope of  
‘measures of  protection’ to include non-discrimination, 
53  Para 191.
54  Para 194.
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special assistance for children deprived of  their family 
environment, the guarantee of  survival and develop-
ment of  the child, the right to an adequate standard of  
living, and the social rehabilitation of  all children who 
are abandoned or exploited.55
Another relevant contentious case is that of  Brothers 
Gomez Paquiyari involves the Peruvian National Police 
which in 1991 detained two brothers, Rafael Samuel and 
Emilio Moisés Gómez Paquiyauri (14 and 17 years old) 
in a counter-terrorism action. The boys were beaten, 
blindfolded, and placed in the trunk of  the patrol car. 
While in custody, they were beaten, tortured and execu-
ted. The Court held that Peru had violated their rights 
to life, humane treatment, personal liberty, a fair trial, 
and judicial protection under the American Convention 
on Human Rights. By applying both the American Con-
vention on Human Rights and the Convention on the 
Rights of  the Child, the Court found that every child 
has the right to special measures of  protection, and un-
derscored that violations of  children’s human rights are 
especially grave. Governments have a special obligation 
to ensure that children’s right to life is never threatened 
and there is a high standard for children’s right to hu-
mane treatment.  As pertaining protection of  the rights 
of  the child, the Court noted that the principle of  the 
best interests of  the child prevails, based ‘on the very 
dignity of  the human being, on the characteristics of  
children themselves, and on the need to foster their de-
velopment, making full use of  their potential’.  
These decisions are supportive sources for cases in-
volving corporal punishment of  children; however they 
do not constitute an explicit prohibition of  all corporal 
punishment of  children.
The European Court of  Human Rights addressed 
corporal punishment in A v UK (1998), that the right of  
the nine year-old applicant ‘A’ to protection from inhu-
man or degrading treatment had been breached, and 
the UK Government was responsible because of  its law 
allowing ‘reasonable chastisement’. The Court ruled that 
the corporal punishment inflicted on A, who had been 
beaten hard on several occasions with a cane, was severe 
enough to constitute a breach of  article 3, and that since 
the applicant’s stepfather, who had inflicted the punish-
ment on him, had been acquitted of  assault occasioning 
actual bodily harm on the grounds that the punishment 
constituted ‘reasonable chastisement’, the Government 
55  Para 196.
had failed to provide adequate protection to the appli-
cant and this constituted a violation of  article 3.56 The 
legality of  school corporal punishment in the UK was 
challenged in Campbell and Cosans v UK (1982), Y v UK 
(1992),and Costello-Roberts v UK (1993).57 Judge Buergen-
thal reflected on the symbolic importance of  this issue 
during a visit by the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights to the European Court of  Human Rights:
While we were there, the European Court was 
hearing a case that concerned the legality under the 
European Convention of  corporal punishment in 
British schools. As we listened to the arguments of  
the parties, one of  my Latin American colleagues 
leaned over to me and whispered, “if  this issue ever 
comes to our Court, we will know that we’ve solved 
the human rights problems of  our region.58
In like manner to Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights, the European Court has not issued a judgment 
condemning all corporal punishment of  children wi-
thout exception. In conclusion, NGOs have been una-
ble to attain regional judgments on point, in spite of  
their success in promoting recognition within other fo-
rums, thereby indicating a limit to transnational human 
rights initiatives. It is ironic that the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights’ rejection of  the request for an 
advisory opinion on this issue cannot be interpreted as 
the Court having had success in resolving human rights 
problems, but instead may indicate deference to states 
to address these issues nationally.  Civil society groups 
were not dissuaded by the Inter-American Court’s re-
fusal to issue an advisory opinion; they redoubled their 
efforts and by 2016 there were a total of  ten states wi-
thin Latin America which prohibit corporal punishment 
of  children.59  Thus, the evolution of  regional human 
rights is not dependent on the advisory output of  the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights; this case indi-
cates that strategies which pursue grassroots tactics may 
56  See also Tyrer v UK (1978), involving a 15-year-old in the Isle 
of  Man, the Court ruled that the judicial “birching” to which he 
had been subjected constituted ‘degrading punishment’ within the 
meaning of  article 3 of  the Convention.
57  There have also been important decisions declaring inadmis-
sible applications challenging bans on corporal punishment in the 
home and in schools, Phillip Williamson and others v UK (2000) this 
involved Christian families alleging that the ban interfered with their 
right to religion and family life). 
58  Thomas Buergenthal, Remembering the Early Years of  the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights, NYU Center for Human Rights and 
Global Justice, Working Paper No. 1 (2005). 
59  Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, see: <http://www.endcor-
poralpunishment.org/progress/prohibiting-states/>
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perhaps more successful in prompting changes through 
national reform initiatives.  By not engaging with this 
issue, one may argue that the Court rendered itself  su-
perfluous and thus does not take part in the crystalliza-
tion of  a new human rights norm. It is possible to see 
the Court’s uneven application of  the conventionality 
control doctrine in the next section addressing capital 
punishment.
4.3. Death Penalty
The prohibition of  death penalty has been the sub-
ject of  a very successful international campaign by civil 
society actors and the Inter-American Commission of  
Human Rights, but it has proven to present legitima-
cy problems for the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights.60  The Inter-American Commission of  Human 
Rights published a report on the death penalty within 
the Inter-American system and urged the OAS Mem-
ber States that have the death penalty to abolish it or 
to impose a moratorium on its use as a step toward 
abolishing it. The Commission also urges those Sta-
tes that have not done so to ratify the Protocol to the 
American Convention on Human Rights to abolish the 
death penalty (1990).61 It should be noted that the su-
ppression of  capital punishment under the Protocol is 
not absolute. States may make a reservation in order to 
maintain capital punishment in the event of  extremely 
serious offenses committed during wartime, as pursued 
by Brazil and Chile. As noted by Sergio Garcia Ramirez, 
unconditional abolition of  the death penalty, in keeping 
with Article 13 of  the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights, is not yet the regional standard within the 
Americas; but once a country has abolished the death 
penalty it may not be reinstated- it is irrevocable.62 Hen-
60  On the civil society groups: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/
what-we-do/death-penalty/> and <https://death.rdsecure.org/
section.php?id=13> and <http://www.icomdp.org/arguments-
against-the-death-penalty/> and <http://www.icomdp.org/argu-
ments-against-the-death-penalty/> and   <http://www.oas.org/
en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2014/115.asp> and <http://
congres.abolition.fr/en/>  And <http://www.deathpenaltyproject.
org/where-we-operate/international/the-inter-american-court-of-
human-rights/>
61  <https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/pdf/deathpenalty.
pdf> and <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleas-
es/2015/062.asp.> The Protocol has been ratified by ratified by 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, 
and Venezuela. (13 out of  35 states within the OAS)
62  GARCIA RAMIREZ, Sergio. ‘The Inter-American Court of  
ce, at present the majority of  OAS member states no 
longer have capital punishment, but a significant mino-
rity retain it.63  Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Guatemala, Jamaica, and the 
United States retain the death penalty, and Brazil, Chile, 
El Salvador, and Peru have outlawed its application in 
ordinary crimes.
The Court successfully issued an advisory opinion 
in 1983 addressing restrictions to the death penalty in 
Guatemala, brought by the Inter-American Commis-
sion of  Human Rights.64 The Court addressed the link 
between non-derogability and incompatibility, noting 
that States may make reservations to rights from which 
no derogation is permitted, provided the reservations 
do not weaken the right as a whole to a very substantial 
extent.65 Indeed, it set forth clear limits on expansion of  
death penalty. Judge Buergenthal reflected on the im-
pact of  the advisory opinion: 
It was prompted by a series of  summary executions 
in Guatemala that the government claimed did not vio-
late the Convention’s prohibition on the reestablish-
ment of  the death penalty because of  its reservation to 
that provision. The Commission concluded that the re-
servation did not apply to Guatemala’s action. Believing 
however that it would be useful for the Court to address 
this problem, the Commission referred the issue in a ge-
neral form to the Court as an advisory opinion request. 
Guatemala, which had not accepted the Court’s con-
tentious jurisdiction, challenged the admissibility of  the 
request on the ground that it was a disguised conten-
tious case brought against it. Once the Court had ruled 
against Guatemala on that point, Guatemala declared 
in open Court that it had decided to suspend all further 
executions, repeatedly emphasizing that its decision had 
nothing to do with the Court’s holding on admissibility. 
The executions did stop. A year earlier, Pope John Paul 
II on a visit to Central America had appealed, without 
success, to the Guatemalan authorities to stop the exe-
Human Rights and the Death Penalty’,Mexican Law Review, v. 3, n. 1, 
p. 99-104, 2009.
63  ICAZA, Emilio Alvarez. ‘The Inter-American System and 
Challenges for its Future’, 107 American Society of  International Law 
Proceedings, April 3-6 2013, 3,6 (ASIL 2014).  See: <http://www.info-
please.com/ipa/A0777460.html> 
64  I/A Court H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 
4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-
3/83 of  September 8, 1983. Series A No. 3.   
65  Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Advisory Practice of  the Inter-
American Human Rights Court’,  Am. J. Int’l L. 79 1, 25 (1985).
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cutions. And we had succeeded with a mere advisory 
opinion. It was quite a morale booster for the Court.66
Unfortunately, the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights was later accused of  trampling on sovereignty 
interests when addressing death penalty within its con-
tentious jurisdiction. Trinidad and Tobago denounced 
the American Convention in 1998 but the Commission 
filed a case with the Court (as there was a one year delay 
for the withdrawal to come into effect) which sought to 
declare Trinidad and Tobago’s mandatory death penalty 
to be in violation of  the American Convention.67 This 
case addressed six issues consisting of  the mandatory 
nature of  the death penalty, the process for granting 
amnesty, pardon, or commutation of  sentence, delays 
in criminal proceedings, deficiencies in treatment and 
condition of  detentions, due process violations, and 
denial of  access to legal aid, all in connection with the 
criminal proceedings resulting from the alleged victims’ 
murder convictions in Trinidad and Tobago.  Although 
Trinidad and Tobago has not filed compliance reports 
with the Court, it has not executed anyone since 1999 
and is subject to review by the Commission.
In 1994, Peru contested the Court’s acceptance of  a 
request for an advisory opinion by the Inter- American 
Commission of  Human Rights on issues of  state and 
individual responsibility involving application of  the 
death penalty.68
The Court noted that the Commission’s questions 
‘are general in nature and concern the obligations and 
responsibilities of  the states or individuals who pro-
mulgate or enforce a law manifestly in violation of  the 
66  Thomas Buergenthal, ‘Remembering the Early Years of  the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights’, supra note 58. 
67  Trinidad and Tobago: Notice to Denounce the American Con-
vention on Human Rights (May 26, 1998), reprinted in Basic Docu-
ments Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, 
Signatures & Current Status of  Ratifications of  the American Con-
vention, OAS/ser. L/V/I.4, doc. rev. 7.  See Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al.  Case, Judgment of  June 21, 2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., 
(Ser. C) No. 94 (2002). See also I/A Court H.R., Matter of  James et 
al regarding Trinidad and Tobago. Provisional Measures. Order of  the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights of  April 03, 2009.  See also 
Boyce and Joseph v. Trinidad and Tobago (14 June 2005).  On Trinidad 
and Tobago’s withdrawal see Natasha Parassram Concepion, ‘The 
Legal Implications of  Trinidad & Tobago’s withdrawal from the 
American Convention on Human Rights’, in 16(3) American Univer-
sity International Law Review 847 (2001).
68  International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of  
Laws in Violation of  the Convention, Advisory Opinion, 1994, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14, para. 12 (9 Dec. 1994).
Convention.’69 The Court considered that the Commis-
sion had standing to present the request for an advisory 
opinion as the Commission is expected to make recom-
mendations to States, for the adoption of  progressive 
measures in favor of  human rights within the framework 
of  their domestic law and constitutional provisions. The 
Court noted that “Under those circumstances, the advi-
sory jurisdiction of  the Court can and should constitute 
a valuable support to enable the Commission “[t]o carry 
out the functions “assigned to it.”70  The Court held;
1. That the promulgation of  a law in manifest conflict 
with the obligations assumed by a state upon ratifying or 
adhering to the Convention is a violation of  that treaty. 
Furthermore, if  such violation affects the protected ri-
ghts and freedoms of  specific individuals, it gives rise to 
international responsibility for the state in question. 
2. That the enforcement by agents or officials of  a sta-
te of  a law that manifestly violates the Convention gives 
rise to international responsibility for the state in question. 
If  the enforcement of  the law as such constitutes an in-
ternational crime, it will also subject the agents or officials 
who execute that law to international responsibility.
Moreover, the Court’s jurisprudence places empha-
sis on the avoidance of  arbitrary application of  the dea-
th penalty, respect for procedural guarantees (including 
due process, in accordance with Article 8 and 25), ap-
plication to only the most serious crimes (not political 
crimes), and respect for the principles of  necessity and 
proportionality.
Nonetheless, in 2005, the Inter-American Court 
appeared to retreat from expanding the use of  the advi-
sory jurisdiction in pursuit of  the conventionality control 
doctrine, as it refused a request by the Inter American 
Commission of  Human Rights for an advisory opinion 
regarding whether states have an obligation to provide 
judicial remedies to persons sentenced to the death pe-
nalty.71 The Commission raised this because Barbados, 
Belize, and Jamaica had enacted what Judge Garcia Ra-
mirez describes as ‘excessive legislation’ relating to the 
death penalty that was deemed to violate human rights 
69  Ibid at para. 24.
70  Ibid at para. 25.
71  Resolution of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights on 
the Request for an Advisory Opinion by the Inter-American Com-
mission of  Human Rights, 24 June 2005.  In comparison see Reid 
v Jamaica Communication No. 250/1987, Views adopted on 20 July 
1990 at para 11 .5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/355/1989 (1994).
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standards.72 The Inter-American Court rejected the re-
quest and noted that had already addressed the death 
penalty in a previous advisory opinions, provisional 
measures, as well as contentious cases. Hence, it called 
upon the Commission to review this jurisprudence in 
order to glean the answer to its questions and noted that 
this jurisprudence should also serve as a guide to States 
(including those who were not parties to the case).73 
At present, the Inter-American Court appears to be 
very cautious about risking the alienation of  Member 
States, in spite of  the fact that there is growing concern 
about the increased penalties (including death penalty) 
being applied to transnational crime (such as narco-tra-
fficking and kidnapping), terrorism, and gang related 
violence within the region.74  There is a clear tension 
between the civil society push to attain an international 
moratorium on the death penalty and the right of  states 
to determine their national penal systems as a means of  
guaranteeing security to their citizens.
4.4. Impeachment
Perhaps one of  the most pressing tests of  a state’s 
level of  democracy is that of  the process of  impeach-
ment.  Impeachment is a marker of  institutional ins-
tability and inter-branch conflict. The recent impeach-
ment of  the President of  Brazil, Dilma Rousseff  was 
a striking attack by the Congress.75  This section will 
72  Sergio Ramirez,  ‘La Pena de Muerte  en la Convencion Ameri-
cana sobre Derechos Humanos y en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte In-
teramericana’, Boletin Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, No. 114 
Sept-Dec. 2005, available at: <https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/
index.php/derecho-comparado/article/view/3853/4820>.
73  See I/A Court H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) 
and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opin-
ion OC-3/83 of  8 September 1983. Series A No. 3.  See  I/A Court 
H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of  
the Guarantees of  the due Process of  Law. Advisory Opinion OC-16/99 
of  1 October 1999. Series A No.16. See also the contentious case 
Boyce et. Al. v. Barbados 20 Nov. 2007.  
See also Da Costa Cadogan v. Barbados (2009).  See also: Raxcacó Reyes v. 
Guatemala (15 September 2005). See also Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala 
(20 June 2007). 
74  See press release by UN Special Rapporteur on the pro-
motion and protection of  human rights and fundamental free-
doms while countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson denounc-
ing the use of  the death penalty in cases involving terrorism: 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.
aspx?NewsID=20659&LangID=E  https://www.un.org/press/
en/2016/gashc4189.doc.htm>
75  Gretchen Helmke notes that ‘. . . Countries heading the list in 
terms of  the total number of  inter-branch threats or attacks are also 
some of  Latin America’s most distressed democracies: Ecuador, 
provide an overview of  the impeachment process, the 
presentation of  a request by the OAS Secretary Gene-
ral to the Inter American Court of  Human Rights for 
an Advisory Opinion, the Inter-American Democratic 
Charter and the Right to Democracy, and a comparison 
to the removal of  judges.
4.4.1. The Impeachment of President Rousseff
On 15 October 2016 three lawyers within the Cham-
ber of  Representatives filed for impeachment based on 
President Rousseff ’s alleged responsibility for failing 
to properly respond to a corruption scandal involving 
Petrobas and the embezzlement of  funds directed to 
her political party, charges of  ‘fiscal pedaling’, as well 
being as violation of  the Annual Budgetary Law due to 
her issuance of  six decrees which provided credits to 
social programs without first obtaining Congressional 
authorization.76 
The Brazilian Constitution (1988) sets forth a pro-
cess in which the speaker of  the lower chamber of  
Congress, in this case Eduardo Cunha (a political op-
ponent of  Ms. Rousseff), had to accept a petition for 
impeachment. Mr. Cunha then formed a 65-member 
congressional committee to investigate the accusations 
and decide if  removal was warranted. The committee 
was created in December, but the court ordered it to 
suspend proceedings.  The committee later resumed its 
work and in a 38-27 vote on 11 April, approved to move 
for a vote on her impeachment in Brazil’s Chamber of  
Deputies. On 17 April 17, the lower chamber voted for 
impeachment. An important point of  contention is that 
in early May, the Supreme Federal Court removed Mr. 
Cunha from his speaker role on charges of  obstructing 
the corruption investigation. After the lower chamber 
vote, the process then moved to the Senate, which had 
Venezuela, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Argentina.’  Gretchen Helmke, 
‘The Origins of  Institutional Crises in Latin America: A Unifies 
Strategic Model and Test’, paper prepared for the Workshop on the 
Rule of  Law, Yale University,  28-29 March 2008.
76  Petrobas is a semi-public Brazilian multinational corporation 
in the petroleum industry. ‘Fiscal pedaling’ is a financial practice that 
consists of  transferring delay of  federal public resources to public 
financial institutions to boost government financial reports. Public 
banks had to pay with their own funds, and then be reimbursed by 
the government once the public treasury had more funds.  Since 
the government had not made the payment, the market consid-
ered the government to have more funds than it actually had. See 
also: <https://www.ft.com/content/6e8b0e28-f728-11e5-803c-
d27c7117d132> 
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to decide, with a simple majority vote, whether to ac-
cept the charges. On 12 May, the Senate voted 55 to 22 
to begin the trial, resulting in Ms. Rousseff ’s suspen-
sion. The vice president, Michel Temer, then took over, 
with the authority to appoint ministers and enact policy. 
The Senate trial was overseen by the chief  justice of  the 
Supreme Federal Court, Ricardo Lewandowski.  Two-
-thirds of  the 81 senators were required vote in favor of  
removing the president from office. As 61 senators vo-
ted in favor, 20 against, President Rouseff  was removed 
from office.  It was concluded that that she had viola-
ted fiscal laws by using funds from state banks to cover 
budget deficit spending.   Mr. Temer will serve as presi-
dent for the remainder of  Ms. Rousseff ’s term through 
the end of  2018 but will not be able to run for president 
in the next election.  President Rousseff  claimed that 
she was a victim of  a coup d’etat, noting ‘They’ve just 
overthrown the first woman elected president of  Brazil, 
without there being any constitutional justification for 
this impeachment.’77  However, the senators voted 42 
to 36 to allow Rousseff  to maintain her political rights, 
hence she can continue to stand in elections and hold 
public office in the future.
In comparison, the European Court of  Human 
Rights has not addressed the legality of  impeachment 
proceedings, but held that there was a violation of  Ar-
ticle 3 of  Protocol Nr. 1 in a case in which the former 
President of  Lithuania had been impeached and was 
subsequently barred from running for elected office wi-
thin the Parliament permanently and irreversibly.78  The 
Court considered this to be disproportionate, as there 
should have been a time limit and process of  review of  
the measure.
Rouseff ’s defense argued that the law does not co-
ver negligent crimes of  responsibility (it has also been 
suggested that fiscal pedaling at 2015 was not yet re-
cognized as a crime, nullem crimen nulla poena sine lege prae-
via, and its lack of  precision makes it unlikely to be con-
sidered a crime according to the principle of  legality. 
Further, they argued that Rouseff  acted under the advi-
ce of  experts, hence she lacked criminal intent.  Finally, 
they stated that Cunha approved of  the impeachment 
in order to retaliate for Rouseff ’s refusal to support 
votes in his favor on the Ethics Committee when he 
77  <http://www.democracynow.org/2016/9/1/dilma_rouss-
eff_on_ouster_this_is> 
78  Paksas v. Lithuania, no. 34932/04, ECtHR 6 January 2011.
was subject to trial for his involvement in the Petrobas 
scandal and the discovery of  secret accounts in Swit-
zerland.  In fact, his acceptance of  the impeachment 
came hours after Rouseff  announced that her party 
would not vote in his favor at the trial. Vice-president 
Temer assumed the presidency and promptly enacted a 
series of  neo-liberal reforms, stating in the media that 
the impeachment process had actually been pursued as 
a means of  enabling these reforms to occur.79 As noted 
by Professor Bircovici, the vagueness of  the grounds 
for impeachment appears to have enabled a shift in the 
system of  checks and balance among the branches of  
government:
The fact that a government is unpopular or 
without parliamentary majority to its policies 
does not justify, necessarily, the initiation of  the 
impeachment process. The impeachment is not a 
vote of  confidence, as occurs in the parliamentary 
system, in the same way that does not constitutes a 
‘recall’ or a form of  popular revoking of  an elective 
office. The respect to the popular choice made in 
the polls is essential in any Democratic State of  
Law. The impeachment process must always be the 
last measure, a power to be exercised with extreme 
cautious in extreme cases of  proven Constitution 
violation, and must have the majority support from 
the society, not only from a parliamentary majority 
exasperated or manipulated by economic and 
political interests […].80
There are clear divisions of  opinion about the lega-
lity and legitimacy of  the impeachment process among 
Brazilian legal and political experts and thus there emer-
ged a state of  crisis regarding the state of  democracy. 81 
4.4.3. The OAS Secretary-General’s Extraordinary 
Request of an Advisory Opinion
The OAS Charter, Article 2 (b) sets forth that one 
of  the purposes of  the OAS is to ‘...promote and con-
79  ‘Temer diz que Dilma sofreu impeachment porque rejeitou 
projeto neoliberal’ (23 September 2016). Pragnmatismo Político. Re-
trieved from: <http://www.pragmatismopolitico.com.br/2016/09/
temer-dilma-sofreu-impeachment-rejeitou-projeto-neoliberal.html> 
80 Gilberto Bercovici (2015), ‘Parecer do Impeachment da Presi-
denta Dilma Rousseff ’, pp. 8-9; available at:  <http://s.conjur.com.
br/dl/parecer-dilma-bercovici.pdf  http://politica.estadao.com.br/
blogs/fausto-macedo/juristas-dizem-que-impeachment-sem-crime-
de-responsabilidade-atinge-constituicao/ >
81  Professor of  Constitutional Law, Pedro Serrano stated that the 
impeachment of  Dilma Rousseff  is an ‘attack to the democracy’ and 
that violates treaties involving the Inter-American Court of  Human 
Rights. Fellet, J. (15 August 2016). ‘Quais as chances de Dilma con-
seguir anular o impeachment na OEA?’ BBC Brasil in Washington.
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solidate representative democracy.’ Judge Garcia-Sayen 
confirms ‘since the inception of  the OAS, democracy 
and respect for the essential human rights were concei-
ved as interdependent.’82 On April 15, 2016, the OAS 
Secretary General, Luis Almagro, issued a statement de-
nouncing the impeachment process in Brazil as politi-
cal in nature, as it was based on poor administration of  
public resources instead of  a criminal accusation, and 
further expressed concern for the constitutional impli-
cations of  this process83:
In addition, it must be highlighted that a presiden-
tial system like the one in Brazil–and the vast majority 
of  those in our Hemisphere, except for the English-
-speaking Caribbean—cannot operate out of  the blue 
as if  it were a parliamentary system, moving for impea-
chment, in this case of  the chief  executive, because of  a 
shift in the political balance of  a coalition government.
In effect, the sustainability of  the presidential sys-
tem does not depend solely on the legislature and the 
alliances generated therein. This is a reality that is useful 
in terms of  efficiency in legislating and governing, but 
does not substitute for popular and sovereign support 
generated at the moment of  voting for the current Pre-
sident. This equation of  popular sovereignty cannot be 
changed for politically opportunistic reasons. If  those 
who wrote the Constitution had wanted to establish a 
kind of  parliamentary or semi-parliamentary solution, 
they would have structured it in that way and the logic 
of  formation of  governments, designation of  the cabi-
net, the political responsibility and the fall of  govern-
ments would be completely different.
We are not making a judgment as to which kind of  
system—presidential or parliamentary–is better, be-
cause that depends on the social and political contract 
of  every society. But the organization of  the Brazilian 
constitutional system is clear and, for that reason, it has 
established the constitutional limits for the exercise of  
an impeachment process. To ignore those limits affects 
the very structure of  how the system operates, and dis-
torts the forces and operation that the Constitution and 
the laws should have.
In pursuit of  an extraordinary recourse, given the 
82  Separate Opinion of  Judge Garcia-Sayan, Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights, YATAMA  Case, Series C. No. 107 (2004) 
at para. 4.
83  <http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.
asp?sCodigo=E-044/16> 
gravity of  the situation, the OAS Secretary General re-
quested an advisory opinion from the Inter-American 
Court regarding the due process rights of  the President 
of  Brazil, Dilma Rousseff  during impeachment procee-
dings against her.  The fact that the OAS Secretary-Ge-
neral felt compelled to turn to the Court for assistance 
indicates the gravity of  the situation. 
He asked the Court to indicate: ‘the specific criteria 
which should be guaranteed, as regarding separation of  
powers, that there should be due process in cases of  
impeachment of  a national authority, the seriousness of  
the causes which could justify such action, taking into 
consideration the impact this has on respect for the 
popular will in choosing its representatives, the situa-
tion of  this person during the proceeding in which she 
should be presumed innocent,  with the aim of  avoiding 
resulting in a violation of  human rights and a serious 
change of  the principles which apply to the entire de-
mocratic system.’  The Secretary-General requested that 
the Court specify ‘which actions or changes to due pro-
cess, such as previous declarations which would indicate 
prejudice by those who have to decide the case in last 
instance, and what would be the consequences on the 
validity of  this process.’ 
He asked the Court to issue an opinion on several 
issues which could substantively affect the due process 
rights in impeachment, and what would be the conse-
quences of:
a) Statements made when voting by those who have 
to decide the opening of  the impeachment process and 
appear to prejudice, moving ahead condemnation opi-
nions or forgiveness or expressing grounds which are 
unrelated to the issue under consideration;
b) The specific recognition on the part of  these per-
sons as to their following instructions, to the detriment 
of  the required level of  impartiality;
c) The invocation of  common causes for various 
officials instead of  for one individual,
d) The charge for events that could have been car-
ried out at a time earlier than that which would be rele-
vant from the legal perspective. 
Finally, the Secretary-General indicated that it was 
absolutely urgent that the Court address  the legality 
of  the reasons invoked to pursue the impeachment of  
President Dilma Rouseff  and the possible violations 
conducted in the Chamber of  Representatives which 
BA
IL
LI
E
T,
  C
ec
ili
a 
M
.. 
 T
he
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
pr
ud
en
ce
 o
f 
Th
e 
In
te
r-A
m
er
ica
n 
Co
ur
t o
f 
H
um
an
 R
ig
ht
s: 
re
jec
tio
n 
of
 re
qu
es
ts
 fo
r a
n 
ad
vi
so
ry
 o
pi
ni
on
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
15
, n
. 1
, 
20
18
 p
.2
54
-2
76
272
approved the documents of  the Special Commission, 
of  the connection of  the votes by the representatives 
motivated by reasons which were unrelated to the char-
ge submitted to the Chamber, as well as the partisan cir-
cumstances which inhibited legislators to take a position 
in conformance with their own personal convictions. 
He noted that the opinion of  this body would be abso-
lutely relevant to the effect of  the decisions which the 
Secretary-General should take in conformance with the 
obligations which are set forth in the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter for the Secretary General accor-
ding to Article 20(1). 
 The Inter-American Court is recognized for being 
a strong voice against impunity and defender of  due 
process rights.  Rather than accept the invitation to su-
pport diplomatic efforts to address the impeachment 
crisis, the Court declined the request. On 23 June 2016, 
The Inter-American Court grounded its rejection by 
stating that the request for an advisory opinion risked 
the issuance of  a premature opinion given the fact that 
the case may be subjected to contentious proceedin-
gs in the future and that the matter had not yet been 
resolved at the domestic level.84  The deference to the 
national system is an indication of  the delicate balance 
the Court must maintain while operating in what Tom 
Gerald Daly describes as ‘”transnational” judicial spa-
ce, with the courts at the domestic and regional levels 
working together as part of  a common judicial project 
to constrain arbitrary state action and uphold human 
rights.’85 Daly states that the Brazilian Supreme Fede-
ral Court does not often refer to the Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights jurisprudence and is critical of  
its lack of  deference to the national court.86  The Court 
also reminded the Secretary-General that Article 20 of  
the Inter-American Democratic Charter specifically re-
cognizes the mandate of  the Secretary-General to take 
action to address these types of  issues, hence rendering 
the need for an advisory opinion superfluous.
84  Resolution of  the Inter-American Court of  Human Rights on 
the Request for an Advisory Opinion by the OAS Secretary General 
23 June 2016. 
85  Tom Gerald Daly, ‘Brazilian ‘Supremocracy’and the Inter-
American Court of  Human Rights: Unpicking an Unclear Relation-
ship.’ P. Fortes et al. (eds) Law and Policy in Latin America.3-4  (Pal-
grave Macmillan UK, 2017).
86  Id. at 5 and 15.  See Gomes Lund et al. v. Brazil, Judgment of  24 
November 2010 (Preliminary Objections, Merits,
Reparations and Costs), para. 44.  The Inter-American Court of  Hu-
man Rights contests the Supreme Federal Tribunal’s approval of  an 
amnesty law.
Given, the lack of  action by the Court, on 9 August 
2016 the Brazilian Workers Party requested a precautio-
nary measure from the Inter-American Commission of  
Human Rights to suspend the impeachment trial due to 
violations of  due process and the lack of  possibility of  
judicial review.87 On 2 September 2016, the Inter-Ame-
rican Commission on Human Rights expressed concern 
over the impeachment process, in particular accusations 
about irregularities, arbitrariness, and lack of  due pro-
cess guarantees. 88  However, it did not issue an imme-
diate precautionary measure; hence the impeachment 
process was unimpeded. It may be that the Commission 
was cautious regarding Brazil because it was undergoing 
a severe financial crisis on account of  Brazilian withdra-
wal of  funding pursuant to the Commission’s decision 
of  2011 ordering provisional measures to suspend the 
Belo Monte Dam Complex in the Amazonian state of  
Para, citing the project’s potential harm to the rights of  
traditional communities living within the Xingu river 
basin. 89  Nonetheless, the Commission indicated that 
it was concerned with the Brazilian Judiciary’s monito-
ring and supervision functions in this case and the ra-
mifications of  the impeachment as pertaining President 
Rousseff ’s rights. In September 2016, Rousseff  appea-
led to the Supreme Federal Tribunal, but it rejected the 
petition in October 2016.90  
A chilling turn of  events occurred after the impea-
chment, as one of  the Supreme Federal Court judges, 
Teori Zavascki died in a plane crash in January 2017. 
The judge was expected to rule on the eligibility of  plea 
bargain testimonies by 77 Odebrecht executives which 
would implicate the several top politicians, including 
President Temer and Senate President Renan Calheiros 
(next in line to Temer).91 This resulted in significant con-
cern about the fragility of  institutions and rule of  law in 
Brazil, as there is uncertainty as to how the corruption 
87  <http://www.pt.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/cidh_
dilma_petition_executive-summary.pdf> 
88  <http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleas-
es/2016/126.asp> 
89  <http://amazonwatch.org/news/2016/0107-iachr-opens-
case-against-brazil-for-human-rights-violations-related-to-belo-
monte-dam>; see also <http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/03/
brazil-breaks-relations-with-human-rights-commission-over-belo-
monte-dam/> 
90  André Richter (20 October 2016). ‘Supreme Court Justice de-
nies appeal to cancel Dilma Rousseff ’s impeachment.’ Agência Brasil. 
91  Odebrecht is a Brazilian construction company implicated 
in the Petrobas corruption scandal, see: <http://www.wsj.com/
articles/marcelo-odebrecht-agrees-to-plea-deal-in-brazilian-corrup-
tion-probe-1480624125> 
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investigation will manage to continue after the loss of  
the judge. One may suggest that by rejecting the OAS 
Secretary General’s request for an advisory opinion, the 
Inter-American Court of  Human Rights missed an op-
portunity to provide supportive guidance to the his offi-
ce during the impeachment crisis which revealed a high 
level of  institutional instability (including within the na-
tional judiciary and at the democratic/constitutional cri-
sis level) in the biggest country within Latin America. It 
is possible to argue that the case would be more appro-
priate for the contentious jurisdiction, but the urgency 
of  situation indicates that it may have benefited from an 
intervention from the Court to address the legal issues 
which had been overshadowed by high tension politics. 
Indeed, the Court could have chosen to approach the 
request as addressing an issue which was of  ‘acute con-
cern to the OAS’, in like manner the ICJ’s refutation of  
Israel’s contestation of  advisory jurisdiction in the Wall 
case on account of  the interest of  the United Nations.92 
Lamentably, instead of  an advisory opinion, the Inter-
-American Court of  Human Rights issued a statement 
calling for an especially careful and timely investigation 
of  the circumstances the plane crash, given the judge’s 
role in important national proceedings.93 
4.4.4. The Inter-American Democratic Charter 
and the Right to Democracy
The Inter-American Court of  Human Rights made 
reference to the fact that the Inter-American Democra-
tic Charter (2001) establishes a specific procedure for 
situations involving the alternation of  a constitutional 
regime which involve other organs within the OAS, in-
cluding the Secretary-General, the Permanent Council 
and the General Assembly:
Article 20
In the event of  an unconstitutional alteration of  the 
constitutional regime that seriously impairs the demo-
cratic order in a member state, any member state or the 
Secretary General may request the immediate convoca-
tion of  the Permanent Council to undertake a collective 
assessment of  the situation and to take such decisions 
92  Advisory Opinion Concerning Legal Consequences of  the Construc-
tion of  a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, International Court 
of  Justice (ICJ), 9 July 2004, 151-52, para. 47, cited by Calidonio 
Schmid, supra note 1 at 429.
93  <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/comunicados/cp_02_17.
pdf> 
as it deems appropriate.
The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, 
may undertake the necessary diplomatic initiatives, in-
cluding good offices, to foster the restoration of  de-
mocracy.
If  such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or 
if  the urgency of  the situation so warrants, the Perma-
nent Council shall immediately convene a special ses-
sion of  the General Assembly. The General Assembly 
will adopt the decisions it deems appropriate, including 
the undertaking of  diplomatic initiatives, in accordance 
with the Charter of  the Organization, international law, 
and the provisions of  this Democratic Charter.
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good 
offices, to foster the restoration of  democracy, will con-
tinue during the process.
Article 21
When the special session of  the General Assembly 
determines that there has been an unconstitutional in-
terruption of  the democratic order of  a member state, 
and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special 
session shall take the decision to suspend said member 
state from the exercise of  its right to participate in the 
OAS by an affirmative vote of  two thirds of  the mem-
ber states in accordance with the Charter of  the OAS. 
The suspension shall take effect immediately.
The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill 
its obligations to the Organization, in particular its hu-
man rights obligations.
Notwithstanding the suspension of  the member sta-
te, the Organization will maintain diplomatic initiatives 
to restore democracy in that state.
This supports the perspective that the Court may 
have been correct to pursue a ‘political question’ ap-
proach to reject the request for the advisory opinion. 
Nevertheless, it is also possible to argue that the OAS 
Secretary General may have been overwhelmed by the 
intensity of  the impeachment crisis and sought institu-
tional backing from the Court.
The Inter American Democratic Charter had been 
proposed by the transitional government in Peru that 
had succeeded Alberto Fujimori in order der to prevent 
further attacks on democracy within the region.  It was 
noted that ‘the peoples of  the Americas have a right to 
democracy and their governments have an obligation to 
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promote and defend it.’94 The charter has been invoked 
in response to coups—the failed one against President 
Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2002 (but Chavez was 
reinstated before the OAS General Assembly met) and 
a successful one against Manuel Zelaya of  Honduras in 
2009. The OAS General Assembly convened a special 
meeting and suspended Honduras’ membership.  
It has been noted that the test of  the Inter American 
Democratic Charter is whether the OAS organs will ap-
ply it to sitting officials who violate democratic norms.95 
The Charter has not yet been applied to impeachment 
cases; hence it is uncertain whether the Inter-Ameri-
can Court of  Human Rights is correct in deferring to 
the other institutions. The Inter-American Democra-
tic Charter preamble states ‘One of  the purposes of  
the OAS is to promote and consolidate representative 
democracy’. As an OAS institution, it is arguable that 
the Court has an obligation to assist other OAS organs 
when requested to support a crisis brought about by 
inter-branch conflict.  Indeed, Judge Garcia-Sayen ob-
served: 
‘It is a well-known fact that the list of  human 
rights has never been static. It has gradually been 
defined and embodied in legal instruments with the 
development over time of  society, the organization 
of  the State, and the evolution of  political regimes. 
This explains why we are currently seeing the 
development and expansion of  political rights, and 
even what some have called the “human right to 
democracy.” This development is expressed in the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, the juridical 
instrument that the inter-American system has 
engendered to strengthen democracy and related 
rights. Its first article stipulates that: “The peoples 
of  the Americas have a right to democracy and 
their governments have an obligation to promote 
and defend it.’96  
94  <http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2011/01/
inter-american_democratic_charter> 
95  See Rubén M. Perina, ‘The Inter-American Democratic Char-
ter An Assessment and Ways to Strengthen It’, available at: <https://
www.oas.org/en/spa/democracia/docs/Brooking_%20Inter%20
Am%20Demo%20Charter%20%20RMP%20%20’12%20pdf.pdf> 
He notes that the definition of  an ‘unconstitutional interruption’ 
remains unclear and that that members of  judicial and legislative or-
gans should be able to address the OAS.  The IADC recognizes the 
elements of  representative democracy as including: respect for the 
rule of  law; human rights and fundamental freedoms; periodic, free 
and fair elections; a pluralistic system of  political parties; the separa-
tion and independence of  powers; fundamental democratic core val-
ues and practices, such as probity and transparency in government 
activities; respect for diversity; and  citizen participation. See also: 
<http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/crisis-graphs.asp> 
96  Separate Opinion of  Judge Garcia-Sayan, Inter-American 
Court of  Human Rights, YATAMA Case, Series C. No. 107 (2004) 
Furthermore, Charter sets forth additional 
guarantees recognizing a link between human rights and 
democracy that implies a relevant role for the Court.97  :
Article 3: ‘Essential elements of  representative de-
mocracy include, inter alia, respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise 
of  power in accordance with the rule of  law, the hol-
ding of  periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret 
balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of  the 
sovereignty of  the people, the pluralistic system of  po-
litical parties and organizations, and the separation of  
powers and independence of  the branches of  govern-
ment.’ 
Article 7: ‘Democracy is indispensable for the effec-
tive exercise of  fundamental freedoms and human ri-
ghts in their universality, indivisibility and interdepen-
dence, embodied in the respective constitutions of  
states and in inter-American and international human 
rights instruments.’ 
In comparison, we may consider the role of  the 
Court in the example of  a case involving the removal 
of  a judge.
4.4.5. The Removal of Judges
The removal of  judges can signal problems with the 
independence of  the judiciary and thus indicate demo-
cratic weakness.  There are various institutions within 
the OAS that may address the removal of  judges.  In May 
2016, Human Rights Watch called upon the OAS Secre-
tary General to invoke the Inter-American Democra-
tic Charter in relation to the Venezuelan government’s 
interference with the independence of  the judiciary.98 
Venezuela’s National Assembly (AN), formally asked 
the OAS Secretary General to apply the Inter-American 
Democratic Charter in view of  the country’s economic 
and political situation. This included the economic cri-
sis, the de facto control by president Maduro of  the Ju-
diciary and Electoral branches of  government, a decree 
of  ‘state of  exception and economic emergency’ passed 
without the approval of  the AN, and threats made by 
at para. 7
97  See also Thomas M. Franck, ‘The Emerging Right to Demo-
cratic Governance’
 86 (1) The American Journal of  International Law, (Jan., 1992), pp. 46-
91.
98  <https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/16/venezuela-oas-
should-invoke-democratic-charter> 
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President Maduro to close down the AN and prevent a 
recall referendum promoted by the opposition. In turn, 
the OAS Secretary General called an emergency mee-
ting of  the Permanent Council of  Member States to 
discuss the situation in Venezuela.99
The Inter-American Court of  Human Rights has 
also been asked to address the removal of  judges within 
its contentious jurisdiction, Case of  the Constitutional 
Tribunal (Camba Campos et. Al.) v. Ecuador (Judgment 
of  28 August 2013).  The Court found violations of  Ar-
ticle 8 in relation to Article 1, and Article 23 on account 
of  the arbitrary termination and removal proceedings 
in violation of  judicial guarantees, as well as having ar-
bitrary effects on the exercise of  the judicial function 
and harm to judicial independence and the guarantee 
of  impartiality.  The Court noted that Ecuadoran law 
expressly prohibited the prosecution of  members of  
the Constitutional Tribunal based on the legal content 
of  their opinions and on the Legislatures’ disagreement 
with a judicial ruling.  The Court cited Art. 3 of  the In-
ter-American Democratic Charter which sets forth that 
essential element of  representative democracy is the se-
paration of  powers and independence of  the branches 
of  government: 
The Court concludes that the dismissal of  all the 
members of  the Constitutional Tribunal entailed a des-
tabilization of  the democratic order that existed at that 
time in Ecuador, because the attack on the three high 
courts of  Ecuador at that time resulted in a rupture of  
the separation and independence of  the branches of  
governments.  The Court stresses that the separation of  
powers is closely related not only to the consolidation 
of  the democratic system, but also seeks to preserve the 
human rights and freedoms of  the people.
This is a very important decision which serves as a 
clear example of  the Inter-American Court’s role as a 
guarantor of  democracy as a foundation for the enjoy-
ment of  human rights in the region. The Court’s reluc-
tance to address the case of  impeachment of  a sitting 
president stands in contrast its strong engagement in the 
case of  the removal of  a judge.  Both cases address the 
state of  democracy and separation of  powers, as well as 
human rights, nevertheless it possible to argue that the 
Court would prefer the presidential case to be presen-
ted under the contentious jurisdiction, as was the case 
99  <http://www.oas.org/en/media_center/press_release.
asp?sCodigo=E-068/16> 
involving the judge.  Alternatively, the Court may have 
been concerned that Brazil may seek to withdraw sup-
port from the Court as it did with the Commission.100
5. final Considerations
Although the four rejections of  requests for advi-
sory opinions may be described as evidence of  strategic 
prudence by the Court, it is indeterminate whether the 
Inter-American Court will continue to develop the sco-
pe of  the advisory opinion in either a broad or narrow 
manner.101  It may be argued that the Court, as other 
international tribunals, is more likely to follow sine wave 
patterns, rather than linear paths when addressing po-
litical cases. International courts within both human 
rights and international criminal law are increasingly 
being challenged; the ICC has received notices of  wi-
thdrawal from Russia, South Africa, Burundi, and Gam-
bia, and the African Court of  Human Rights suffered 
the withdrawal of  Rwanda. The Inter-American Court 
itself  underwent threats of  withdrawal from Venezuela, 
Ecuador, and Peru.102  
The ICC has sought to embark on a strategy of  
creative expansion of  investigation of  crimes in order 
to address environmental harm and damage to cultural 
property, perhaps to underscore its continued relevance 
or added value in normative analysis.103104   Similarly, the 
PCA addressed the duty to conduct Environmental Im-
pact Assessments in the Philippines v. China case.104105 
100 <http://latindispatch.com/2011/05/03/brazil-breaks-rela-
tions-with-human-rights-commission-over-belo-monte-dam/> 
101  Buergenthal stated ‘Whether the scope of  the Court’s advi-
sory jurisdiction will expand further or begin to contract is closely 
related to the perceived needs of  the inter-American system for the 
protection of  human rights.’ He set forth that If  more states and the 
Commission submit more contentious cases to the Court, ‘resort to 
its advisory jurisdiction may decline and its importance diminish.’ 
Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of  the Inter-American Human Rights 
Court, supra note 64 at 26.
102  See generally: <http://interamericanhumanrights.org/back-
ground/challenges-and-criticisms/> 
103 104 The ICC issued a decision cultural destruction of  prop-
erty in the Ahmad al-Faqi al-Mahdi case.  It issued a statement that 
it would pursue investigation of  cases involving crimes that result 
in the ‘destruction of  the environment’, ‘exploitation of  natural 
resources’ and the ‘illegal dispossession’ of  land. <https://www.
theguardian.com/global/2016/sep/15/hague-court-widens-remit-
to-include-environmental-destruction-cases> 
104 105 See:<http://www.ejiltalk.org/environmental-aspects-of-
the-south-china-sea-award/>
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It may be argued that the Inter-American Court has 
chosen to follow a parallel strategy with its Advisory 
Opinion on the Environment and Human Rights (2017) 
that also upheld the duty to conduct Environmental 
Impact Assessments.  On the other hand, given the cur-
rent climate of  emphasis on sovereignty and backlash 
against human rights, the Court may wish to show de-
ference to states and avoid controversial decisions.105106 
The Court and the Commission are both facing fun-
ding crises and this has already resulted in a temporary 
complete halt of  cases in the latter institution.106107  It 
remains to be seen which strategic choice the Court will 
pursue, and it may well continue to display mixed ap-
proaches, although it may be that the Court may seek 
to rely more on the contentious jurisdiction to address 
complex, political claims in deference to the principle 
of  consent.  The case examples of  restraint signal a 
possible reluctance to utilize the advisory jurisdiction 
to expand the interpretation of  human rights when led 
by civil society or consolidate democracy.  Nevertheless, 
the Advisory Opinion on Gender Identity, and Equa-
lity and Non-Discrimination with regard to Same-Sex 
Couples (2017) indicates otherwise.  There is an open 
question as to whether there will be significant backlash 
to this opinion and in turn, whether the Inter-American 
Commission of  Human Rights will choose to focus 
even more on pursuing contentious case, leaving the 
advisory jurisdiction as a mechanism for states to check 
on normative consultation. There is a tension between 
the conventionality control doctrine and the limitation 
of  the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, and this in turn may 
have unintended consequences. 
105 106 Thomas Carothers, 8(3) ‘Closing Space for International 
Democracy and Human Rights Support.’ In  J Human Rights Practice 
358-377 (2016); see also Inter-American Human Rights Network, 
‘Strengthening the Impact of  the Inter-American Human System 
Through Scholarly Research’ 5 (April 2016) available at <http://dis-
covery.ucl.ac.uk/1478296/1/ReflectiveReport-web.pdf>  (page 5)
106 107 <http://nobelwomensinitiative.org/inter-american-hu-
man-rights-system-underfunded/> As a matter of  fact, both the 
Court and the Commission are chronically underfunded institutions 
subject to frequent and public criticism and threats of  withdrawal by 
OAS member states, particularly in reaction to controversial Court 
rulings.
